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 Construction governance failures can lead to the 
construction of the wrong infrastructure, poor quality 
construction, and excessively high prices for work.  
There is some evidence from both other sectors and the 
construction sector itself that improved transparency, 
especially when combined with oversight, can improve 
development outcomes through its impact on the 
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quality of governance. This paper reviews that evidence, 
discusses costs and benefits of greater transparency in 
particular with regard to the contracting and delivery 
process in construction, and briefly discusses an initiative 
to improve governance in public construction—the 
Construction Sector Transparency Initiative. 
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Poor governance in public construction is a considerable development issue.  
Construction is a major sector, responsible for the development of infrastructure capital 
that is central to growth and improved quality of life.  Governance failures can lead to the 
construction of the wrong infrastructure, poor quality construction and excessively high 
prices for work.  There is some evidence from both other sectors and the construction 
sector itself that improved transparency, especially when combined with oversight, can 
improve development outcomes through its impact on the quality of governance.  This 
paper reviews that evidence, discusses costs and benefits of greater transparency in 
particular with regard to the contracting and delivery process in construction, and briefly 
discusses an initiative to improve governance in public construction –the Construction 
Sector Transparency Initiative. 
 
 
Mismanagement, Corruption and Development Outcomes in Construction 
 
A justification for greater transparency and oversight in publicly-financed construction 
should start with an elaboration of the problem to be addressed.  This problem is one of 
poor outcomes in a large sector that is central to development.  Construction is a $1.7 
trillion industry worldwide, much of which is linked to publicly financed projects.  
Government investment in road transport alone can account for between 2-3.5% of GDP.   
 
Outcomes from this financing are frequently sub-optimal.  In India, for example, nearly 
half of all roads projects see cost overruns greater than 25 percent, and more than half see 
delays adding 50 percent or more to completion times (see Figure One).
2  The quality of 
infrastructure constructed can also leave much to be desired.  Press reports suggest that 
an Indian government survey of a recent rural roads project found one fifth of completed 
roads to be unsatisfactory.
3   
 
Similar statistics can be found around the world – for example, a global survey suggests 
that “substantial cost escalation is the rule rather than the exception” in infrastructure 
projects estimating that for rail projects, average cost escalation is 45%, for fixed links 
(tunnels and bridges) it is 34% and for roads, 20%.
4 
 
Some of this cost and time escalation, as well as poor quality, are linked to weak 
governance and corruption, which are endemic in the sector.  Construction ranks as the 
most corrupt industry in global surveys.  Construction firms represented in the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
have significantly larger ‘bribe budgets’ than the average firm, and they bribe more often.  
Of their total bribe budget, a larger percentage goes to gain government contracts –an 
average of 23 percent for construction compared to 15 percent for all firms in the sample.  
                                                 
2 World Bank, 2007. 
3 http://www.igovernment.in/site/condition-of-indias-rural-roads-found-unsatisfactory/ 
4 Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl, 2003. 3 
 
Construction firms in Eastern Europe believe that a typical payoff made for securing a 
government contract in their industry is around 7 percent of the contract value.
5   
 
 







We have evidence that governance failure may be one factor behind high costs.  Using 
data on roads projects, we can analyze the average costs per meter squared for a standard 
road reconstruction assignment.
6  The average cost across the 28 countries for which we 
have data was around $33.2 per square meter.  For those countries with below average 
costs, the Transparency International Construction Perceptions Index averaged 3.6, 
compared to 2.4 in countries with above average costs (where a low CPI is evidence of 
perceived widespread corruption).  A regression analysis suggests that lower perceived 
corruption is significantly associated with lower costs in this sample, a result weakly 
robust to the inclusion of GDP per capita.
7   
 
Similarly, lower reported bribes payments are associated with lower costs, as is clear 
from the graph below.  Costs for road rehabilitation are higher in countries where the 
average bribe paid for government contracts is larger.  The average cost paid per square 
meter for rehabilitation of a two lane highway across eighteen countries for which we 
have good data on both bribes and costs was $36.  In countries where the average bribe 
for a government contract was reported to be below 2 percent of the contract value, this 
cost was $30.  For countries where bribes for government contracts were reported to be 
larger than 2 percent of their value, average costs were $46 (Figure Two). 
 
                                                 
5 Kenny, 2009. 
6 This for a two-lane road between 6-8 meters wide with a bituminous surface, for countries where we have 
four or more estimates based on individual project data Data from the ROCKs database 
http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/rd_tools/rocks_main.htm 
7 The results suggest that an increase in the CPI (reflecting reduced corruption) from Pakistan’s score to 
Ghana’s would be associated with a drop in Pakistan’s road construction prices of around 20 percent.  The 
equation is Cost = 51.9 – 5.9*(CPI), with the constant and CPI entering at one percent, R=0.23, N=28.  
Including GDP per capita reduces the coefficient on CPI to 4.5 and the significance to ten percent (GDP per 
capita does not enter significantly).  For a range of World Bank financed infrastructure goods and works 
contracts, Kenny and Musatova (2009) find that aid dependency and weak institutions lead to fewer bidders 
and a higher risk of price escalations. 4 
 
 







Corruption and mismanagement have been repeatedly linked to reduced construction 
quality, as firms skimp on work and materials while bribing officials to look the other 
way.  Examples uncovered in investigations of corruption in World Bank Group projects 
include roads built to lower standards or narrower width, buildings constructed with 
inadequate reinforcing or honeycombed concrete –and buildings not built at all.   
 
The World Bank Integrity Department’s Detailed Implementation Review of Bank 
projects in India’s health sector provides further cases.  In the case of the Orissa Health 
Systems Development Project, the DIR, aided by a civil engineer, visited 55 project 
hospitals; at 93 percent of them, it observed problems like uninitiated or incomplete 
work, severely leaking roofs, crumbling ceilings, molding walls, and non-functional 
water, sewage, and/or electrical systems. Yet the construction management consultants 
who supervised the work certified 38 of these hospitals to be complete to project 
specifications, and in February 2006 the Orissa Department of Health and Family 
Welfare reported that work at 45 of them was complete.  Again, while the World Bank 
financed Kecamatan Development Project in Indonesia delivered some impressive 
outcomes, one estimate is that about 24 percent of expenditures in road construction 
under the project were ‘lost.’
8   
 
Low quality construction related to corruption can also dramatically reduce infrastructure 
life spans –by one-half or more. One estimate is that a dollar’s worth of materials 
skimped in road projects to finance corrupt payments reduces the economic benefit of the 
road by $3.41 as a result of its impact on quality and lifespan.
9 Significant social costs 
can also be involved.  In 1999, more than half of all buildings in Turkey failed to comply 
with construction regulations, even though 98 percent of the country's population lives in 
earthquake-prone zones.
10  One result of this evasion was a considerable number of 
avoidable fatalities in the 1999 earthquake –11,000 people died.  Allegations regarding a 
                                                 
8 Olken, 2007. 
9 Olken, 2007. 
10 This according to the Turkish Architects and Engineers Association, Celestine Bohlen Turkish 
Earthquake Survivors Blame Corruption New York Times - 8/20/99 5 
 
school collapse related to corruption have also emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 




The Role for Greater Transparency and Oversight  
 
The current procurement and oversight systems of governments and donor partners are, 
of course, designed to reduce the impact of governance failure.  That some of the 
examples of failure above were drawn from donor-financed government projects is 
evidence that existing procurement and oversight regimes may not always be enough to 
deter corruption. As further evidence, a recent survey of firms that bid on international 




Furthermore, procurement systems alone can never be enough to ensure quality delivery.  
The most competitive procurement based on the strongest designs can offer little defense 
against the lowest bidder skimping on delivery and bribing to cover up shoddy work.  
Indeed, Gresham’s law can apply to lowest-cost procurement outcomes when we cannot 
or do not measure quality.
12  Good contractors bid a reasonable price.  Bad contractors 
can bid low despite the fact that work cannot be completed to standard at that price.
13  If 
we fail to monitor outcomes, such firms can get away with delivering poor quality.   
 
And shoddy implementation may be a considerably larger problem from the point of 
view of development impact than is collusion or corruption that increases initial bid 
prices.  Imagine a road project that costs $1 million to build but generates $320,000 in 
economic returns each year after construction for ten years.  The project’s overall 
economic rate of return is about 30 percent (the average rate of return for World Bank 
transport projects exiting FY97-02).  If the project had suffered from collusive bidding, 
and this had raised the price of construction by 20 percent, to $1.2 million, the project’s 
ERR would drop to 26 percent.
14  This is a significant decline, but it still leaves the 
project at more than double the ‘hurdle rate’ of a 10 percent ERR.
15   
 
Imagine instead that the bidder agreed a contract price of $1 million, but used insufficient 
and substandard materials to build the road, spending only $800,000 on construction and 
pocketing the remaining $200,000.  This reduces the road’s traffic capacity so that yearly 
economic returns fall by a quarter.  It also shortens the useful life of the road to five 
years.  This would reduce the overall ERR to 15 percent.  The same financial level of 
corruption has a considerably larger economic impact in this case, reducing the ERR by 
                                                 
11 Soreide, 2006.  Regarding the World Bank, there is some evidence that Bank-financed procurements are 
sometimes being won by those firms with the greatest comparative advantage in bribery rather than leading 
global firms which can deliver the best product at the lowest price (Kenny and Musatova, 2009).   
12 Thanks to Giovanni Casartelli for this observation. 
13 Manelli and Vincent 1995. 
14 This (and subsequent calculations) view the corrupt payment as a transfer but accounts for a (high) 
marginal cost of government funds lost to corruption of 1.50 (a fifty percent deadweight loss). 
15 This is approximately the economic impact of poor road construction suggested by Olken (2007). 6 
 
15 percent rather than 4 percent.  Such incentives may help to explain cross-country 
evidence suggesting an impact of weak institutions and high corruption out of all 
proportion to a 10 or 20 percent mark-up in the costs of investments.
16   
 
Related to this, the evidence from a large sample of World Bank projects is that, in 
general, the bigger challenge to achieving results in investment lending is not 
procurement risk, but delivery risk.  Pohl and Mihaljeck found that factors such as cost 
overruns and delays in delivery are comparatively minor in determining the gap between 
appraised and re-appraised economic rates of return on Bank projects.  It was factors 
before and after the procurement process which made the largest difference.
17   
 
There is considerable evidence that (additional) transparency and oversight are 
potentially powerful tools to reduce the development impact of corruption.   Not least, 
this is strongly suggested by World Bank experience working in environments where 
transparency and oversight are allowed to work.  Linked to the literature that suggests 
strong institutions deliver better aid outcomes,
18 World Bank projects in countries with 
the strongest protection of civil rights generate economic rates of return 8-22 percentage 
points higher than projects in countries with the weakest civil rights (the mean rate of 
return in their sample is 16 percent). There is suggestive evidence that the route for this 
impact is from civil liberties through citizen voice and government accountability to 
greater efficiency in government service provision.
19   
 
Specific to construction, evidence on road costs and political rights suggests greater 
ability to effect change on government contracts can improve outcomes.  Kaufmann and 
Kraay’s ‘Voice and accountability’ indicator measures the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Data from World Bank financed 
roads contracts in 28 countries suggests that those countries which see above average 
voice and accountability pay $30 per square meter for rehabilitation of a two lane 
highway compared to $37 in countries with low voice and accountability.
20  Separate data 
on cost overruns from 130 World Bank financed road projects in 24 countries suggests 
that countries with voice and accountability scores below the global average see average 
cost overruns of 46%.  This compares to countries with above average voice and 




                                                 
16 Kenny, 2009. 
17 Pohl and Mihaljeck, 1992. 
18 Wright, 2006, Burnside and Dollar, 1998 –although note these results may be fragile.  A re-analysis 
suggests institutions do not have a robust impact on aid effectiveness (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005b) 
19 Isham et. al., 1997.  Beneficiary participation was also found to improve project performance in a sample 
of 121 World Bank rural water supply and sanitation projects  (Isham et. al., 1994).  Similarly, Dollar and 
Levin (2005) find that a property rights/rule of law measure is strongly correlated with World Bank 
investment lending outcomes. 
20 It should be noted that there is no statistically significant difference between outcomes when GDP per 
capita is controlled for in a regression analysis. 
21Voice and accountability measures from  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp, road 
project data from http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/rd_tools/rocks_main.htm 7 
 




Project-level experience provides further evidence in support of the impact of 
transparency and oversight on project outcomes.  Despite considerable evidence of losses 
to corruption described above, the Indonesia Kecamatan Development Project involved 
close local (beneficiary) oversight produced savings of between 25 to 56 percent over 
conventional infrastructure projects.
22  In Bangladesh, a study of community oversight of 
infrastructure projects suggested that costs and completion times were more than 25 
percent lower while asset life was four times longer on such projects compared to 
standard approaches.
23   
 
Regarding post-procurement oversight of projects in particular, work by the Concerned 
Citizens of Abra for Good Governance in the Philippines performing quality checks on 
public procurement projects has, inter alia, led to a remove and replace order for portions 
of a highway project and seen the conviction of eleven employees of the Department of 
Public Works and Highways.  Again, as part of the Bali Urban Infrastructure Project, 
financed by the World Bank, a range of measures were put in place to strengthen 
contractor competition including engaging the association of contractors and civil society 
in a process of reform that increased transparency, established an effective complaints 
handling mechanism, and extended random checks and technical audits.  Complaints 
received increased from fewer than ten per year prior to the project to greater than 200 in 
the project’s first full year.  Prices charged for works and inputs under the project 
(concrete, excavation and road works) fell over the first three years, compared to 
considerable price increases for the same inputs and works in non-project contracts.  
Savings amounted to 21 percent of estimated costs.
24   
 
 
Limits to Transparency and Oversight 
 
Although there is clear micro evidence of the advantages to transparency and oversight 
mechanisms, we should also accept their limitations. A case from education in India 
suggested that despite considerable de jure powers of oversight by village education 
                                                 
22 Wong and Guggenheim, 2005.   
23 GHK et. al. 2004. 






























committees in Uttar Pradesh and efforts to increase interest in and awareness of schooling 
quality and the role of village education committees, outcomes remain poor and village 
education committees are dysfunctional.
25  The authors of the education study conclude 
that large-scale oversight mechanisms work best when stakeholders can directly and 
easily observe problems.  This may suggest the more appropriate oversight focus for any 
direct community oversight role.  In road construction, for example, this might be to spot 
problems such as the lack of a road where one should be, one lane where there should be 
two, or potholes where there should be repairs. 
 
A second feature worth noting is the considerable costs that can be associated with active 
transparency and oversight.  The Indonesia Urban Poverty Program, financed by the 
World Bank, disburses about $100m a year to over 8,000 villages across Indonesia and 
provides one example of both benefits and costs.  As part of the oversight mechanism, 
100,000 elected volunteers serve as project overseers.  In addition, a website records 
project details including individual project details, implementation status, full consultant 
contracts, consultant invoices, status of disbursement and details on travel expenses 
related to the project and a complaint handling mechanism.
26 The project website is 
visited more than 2,000 times a day, and recorded 6,423 complaints in 2007.  84 of these 
complaints involved mis-use of funds totaling $80,000.  As a result of the complaints a 
court action has been launched and $32,000 in funds has been returned to date.   
 
At the same time, the total cost of capacity building and oversight mechanisms is 
estimated at 13 percent of project costs, or a little over $24m out of a $186m project.  
These costs are lower than the benefits frequently associated with oversight and 
transparency in community projects, and many are one-off expenditures associated with 
benefits that will far outlast the life of the project –but they are still considerable.   
 
This suggests the possibility that measures to improve governance, much like other 
regulation designed to minimize market or government failure, can carry higher costs 
than the economic benefit of the reduced corruption that they are associated with.  Ben 
Olken’s examination of anti-corruption interventions in community-driven road projects 
in Indonesia suggested that sending out invitations to village meetings to discuss projects 
might fall into that category, for example.
27   
 
 
Publishing Contracts and Implementation Details 
 
With that caveat, one comparatively cheap and potentially powerful tool to improve 
outcomes in public procurement is the regular publication of contract and implementation 
details.  In particular, the publication of government contracts would improve 
transparency (and so hopefully reduce corruption).  There is a clear public interest in 
access to such documents as they involve distribution of public funds or publicly-
controlled properties.  Publication would also provide a large stock of public intellectual 
                                                 
25 Banerjee et al 2008. 
26 Soraya, 2009a. 
27 Olken, 2007. 9 
 
capital which should (i) reduce legal costs of contracting; and (ii) when combined with 
information on contract performance, help spread best practices and ease the process of 
learning lessons from failed approaches.   
 
Contracts specify what is to be delivered when, how, by whom and at what unit prices.  
As such, they contain a wealth of information about who will benefit from the contract, 
potential waste or padded prices, and what the project outputs should be.  All of this 
information can be compared against original bid documents, information about 
implementation and final outputs to allow third parties to monitor procurements, awards 
and the efficacy of resource utilization.   
 
The potential benefits are clear.  The ease and practicality of contract publication in 
particular is perhaps less so.  At the same time, many governments also have laws on the 
books that grant public access to the majority of contracts on demand, and a few 
countries are already routinely publishing contract and implementation documentation. 
 
 
Contract And Implementation Details Publication to Date 
 
While presumption of publication is still a comparative rarity, in many countries, 
Freedom of Information Acts give citizens theoretical access to contracts.  As an 
example, the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) gives citizens the right to access 
records of the executive branch as long as such documents are not exempt because they 
are properly classified or involve trade secrets for example.  Even then, efforts must be 
made to provide the fullest possible disclosure (redacting relevant sections rather than 
withholding the entire document).  In theory, then, most contracts signed by the US 
government (or at least the majority of text of most contracts) could be obtained by 
citizens.   
 
Nonetheless, FOIA requests are time consuming and can incur significant charges (for 
documents over 100 pages, review of material to ensure it can be released is charged at 
rates as high as $25 per hour).  And FOIA requests would be necessary to obtain the 
contracts, because federal agencies appear disinclined to volunteer them.  A 1999 attempt 
to obtain copies of 81 Federal Contracts listed in the Washington Post over a week-long 
period found that none were voluntarily disclosed by federal agencies.
28  Furthermore, 
requests are likely to face challenges in jurisdictions including the US and Europe from 
contracting companies filing ‘reverse’ FOI requests to limit or restrict disclosure.
29 
 
Furthermore, many countries lack FOIAs or see them weakly enforced.  More than 50 
countries have freedom of information laws, and 15–20 more are considering them.
30  
                                                 
28 http://www.cptech.org/ecom/may1999.txt 
29 In these jurisdictions, the government must notify companies of the FOI request and consider any 
requests to keep the information confidential.  Whilst the prejudice caused by possible disclosure must be 
balanced against the public interest in knowing the requested information, it is likely that, at the very least, 
this process will add complexity, time and expense to contract publication under FOIAs (Corey, 2005)  
30 http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnote93.pdf 10 
 
But this suggests that the majority of countries lack such legislation.  And the mere 
existence of a freedom of information law is clearly inadequate.  A recent survey of the 
effectiveness of freedom of information laws in Armenia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Peru and 
South Africa found that, on average, only 35 percent of requests for information were 
fulfilled.
31  In short, while FOIAs suggest that contracts and implementation reports could 
be published, the better model is to proactively publish such information. 
 
Some countries have already  taken steps towards this appr oach.  Indonesia routinely 
publishes considerable infor mation for som e projects. The Urban Poverty Program was 
highlighted above.  In addition, the Nati onal Program for  Community Em powerment 
(Program National Pemberdayaan Masyarak at, PNPM), a community-led develop ment 
program in Indonesia, also publishes deta iled inform ation.  Project data and 
documentation that is routinely published on the project’s website includes:  
  Contract price, start and finish dates, and contractors’ names and addresses 
  Contracts (billing rates are excluded) and contract variations 
  Reports on project performance  
  Audit reports 
  Fund disbursements  
  Invoices and invoicing information.
32 
 
Other countries routinely publish information on a wider range of government-financed 
contracts.  Argentina publishes detailed information about contract awards and 
implementation, Turkey publishes winning bids for government contracts, the Philippines 
allows civil society representatives to observe the tendering process and Uganda 
publishes procurement audits and contract awards on the web.  Colombia’s government 
e-procurement website allows a range of project documents to be viewed by the public 
online. For example, a $1.24 million project for the construction of a passenger terminal 
on river Barrancabermeja has 132 project documents available for review. These 
documents include: 
  Draft Terms of Reference  
  Definitive Terms of Reference 
  Clarifications during the selection process  
  Act from the Awarding Meeting 
  Contract  
  Contract Extensions and other modifications 
  Evaluation Report 
By 2008, there were 99,455 transactions recorded and the site received an average of 
453,402 visitors per month.
 33 
 
Again, the government of the Australian State of Victoria mandates full publication of all 
Victoria government contracts (including contract revisions) for contracts worth in excess 
                                                 
31 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/freedom.htm. 
32 World Bank, 2009. 
33 World Bank, 2009. 11 
 
of AUS$10m.
34 In Victoria, exceptions are made for information in contracts that is 
genuinely a commercial secret the release of which would unreasonably disadvantage the 
contractor, or which it is against the public interest to disclose, guided by language in the 
state’s freedom of information act.  The intent is to limit nondisclosure to the narrowest 




Costs and Benefits of Systemic Full Publication of Contracts  
 
The argument against presumption of publication is usually one of cost.  For example, the 
US government (specifically the former Director of the OMB, Mitchell Daniels) resisted 
pressure to move towards a presumption of publication because “many federal contracts 
(or the documents that are associated with a contract) contain trade secrets and other 
confidential business information that is protected under federal law.  As a result, agency 
staff would have to carry out an individualized review of the contract to identify any such 
confidential information and redact it before publishing the contract”.  Each year, Daniels 
noted, the US government enters into 9.5 million contracts of which half a million are in 
excess of $25,000.  Even reviewing only those contracts over the $25,000 threshold 
would require significant resources.
36 
 
In its deliberations, the Victoria (Australia) public accounts committee concluded that the 
insistence of confidentiality clauses in government contracts frequently came from the 
government, not the contractor, suggesting that fears regarding the complexity of 
reviewing contracts for commercial secrets may be exaggerated.
37  Furthermore, it is 
difficult to see the significant public interest in restricting information regarding company 
information in contracts beyond those involving patentable (but unpatented) technology.  
That some countries are managing a process of routine proactive disclosure further 
suggests that it is administratively possible.    
 
With a suitable dollar cut-off level for automatic publication, it is likely that the review 
burden could be reduced while still ensuring the publication of contracts involving a 
considerable percentage of government financing.  Using data from the business 
warehouse on the size of World Bank financed contracts in FY05 gives an indication of 
the likely magnitudes involved.  Figure Four suggests that 7,772 contracts were signed 
under World Bank projects in FY05 with a total value of USD8.6bn.  Out of this universe 
of contracts, 5,298 contracts accounting for USD8.5bn had a value of above 
USD100,000.  Only 1,218 contracts, or 16 percent of all contracts, had a value of above 
USD1m –but these contracts accounted for 83 percent of the total value of all contracts 
signed. 
                                                 
34 See http://www.tenders.vic.gov.au/CA256AEA00206A7D/webpages/PublicContractsFrameset?Open 
35 Government of Victoria, Australia: Ensuring Openness and Probity in Victorian Government Contracts: 
A Policy Statement 11 October, 2000. 
36 Source: Letter from Mitchell Daniels to Ralph Nader and James Love, November 26 2001.  Imagine the 
average $25k-plus contract contains 200 pages in need of review, the reviewer reads 5 pages an hour and 
charges $25 per hour, for the 500,000 contracts worth more than $25,000, the US government would have 
to set aside $500 million in reviewing fees. 
37 Victoria (Australia) (2000). 12 
 
 
To extrapolate based on a developing country example, India sees around 5,000 $1m-plus 
contracts signed in the roads sector a year.  Assuming India’s share of developing country 
road construction is about the same as its share of developing country national income, 
this suggests a little over 60,000 $1m-plus roads contracts in developing countries each 
year –or a little under an average of 400 per developing country.  Road construction is 
probably the largest single government-financed construction activity worldwide.  As a 
back of the envelope calculation, it might be expected that the average number of $1m-
plus government financed construction contracts per developing country might be on the 
order of 2,000 per year. 
 






With a higher cut-off, fewer contracts would be involved.  As we have seen, the state 
government of Victoria publishes online the full contract for any government tender 
worth above AUS$10m (approximately USD7.7m).  A cut-off of USD5m would affect 
4.2 percent of World Bank-financed contracts (326 contracts) accounting for 60 percent 
of total contract value in FY05.  A cut-off of USD10m would affect 2.0 percent of Bank-
financed contracts (158 contracts) accounting for 47 percent of total contract value in 
2005.  
 
It is plausible to imagine significant financial savings to governments from contract 
publication in terms of reduced prices due to reductions in corrupt payments.  Investment 
climate surveys suggest that bribe fees equal an average of about 3.2 percent of contract 
values–with sector-level estimates ranging considerably higher.  Greater threat of 

















$k Size of Contract
Number of Contracts Dollar Value of Contracts ($k)13 
 
the level of corruption in Indonesian road projects by 8 percent, for example.
38  If 
contract and implementation detail publication reduced levels of corruption by only 5 
percent, this suggests a reduction in bribe fees equal to 0.16 percent of total contract 
values, which is likely to be a multiple of the review costs involved in publishing these 
contracts.
39  Furthermore, given that estimates for the total economic cost of corruption 
are considered to be as high as 15-50 percent of the funds involved,
40 it appears clear that 
the economic benefits of publication may be considerably larger than the direct financial 
benefits to government in terms of lower initial contract prices. 
 
Once contracts have been published, barriers to the publication of a range of 
implementation documentation largely fall away.  This suggests that with relatively little 




The Construction Sector Transparency Initiative 
 
The Construction Sector Transparency (CoST) Initiative is a global initiative designed to 
support more widespread publication of construction contracts and implementation 
details.  It is a partnership between governments, private sector and civil society, which 
aims to increase transparency and accountability in construction procurement. CoST will 
require public disclosure of contracting, payment and oversight information regarding 
government-financed construction projects. For some contracts, this information will be 
validated and compared to outcomes on the ground.  A multistakeholder group of civil 
society, government and private sector will oversee the process of information release 
and validation.  The core idea of CoST is “Get What You Pay For.”  The premise of the 
initiative is that greater accountability and transparency will reduce costs and improve the 
quality of government-financed construction. 
 
CoST is designed to regularize publication of the following list of contract details: (i) 
identification details related to the contract, including project specification, purpose, 
location, intended beneficiaries, and feasibility study; (ii) project funding related to the 
contract, including financing agreement; (iii) tender process details including a list of 
tenderers and the tender evaluation report; (iv) award details including contractor name, 
contract price, contract scope of work and contract program; (v) contract execution 
details including individual significant changes to the contract which affect the price and 
reasons for those changes, individual significant changes to the contract which affect the 
program and duration and reasons for those changes, and details of any re-award of main 
contract; and (vi) post completion details including contractor name, actual contract 
                                                 
38 Olken, 2007. 
39 Imagine the average $5m-plus contract contains 500 pages in need of review, the reviewer reads 5 pages 
an hour and charges $25 per hour, for the 326 contracts worth more than $5m, for World Bank financed 
contracts, $815,000 in reviewing fees would be required to review contracts worth an aggregate of over $5 
billion.  Assuming the 0.16 percent savings held, this would amount to $8m –about a ten to one benefit/cost 
ratio. 
40 Jain, 2001. 14 
 




CoST is currently being piloted in seven countries (Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Ethiopia and the UK).  Guatemala has CoST Associate status.  An 
International Secretariat financed by DFID provides technical and financial assistance to 
pilot countries.  An International Advisory Group (IAG) provides guidance regarding 
CoST design issues to pilot countries and the Secretariat as well as advice to DFID with 
regard to the future of the initiative.  The World Bank is providing technical inputs and 
advice to DFID, the IAG, the Secretariat and pilot countries. 
 
The pilot stage is further demonstrating the feasibility of publication and the utility of 
multi-stakeholder oversight of the process.  At the same time, it has highlighted the need 
for considerable government leadership and capacity with regard to publication.  If 
existing management information systems within agencies do not regularly collect the 
type of information to be released by CoST, preferably electronically, publication can 
carry reasonably large transactions costs. Without government commitment, these costs 
are unlikely to be met.  Even in cases where existing management information systems 
are strong, the commitment to publication carries with it the burden of responding to 





As a vital activity for development and one that frequently falls victim to failures of 
governance, publicly-financed construction could benefit considerably from improved 
oversight.  One tool to provide such oversight uses transparency in contracting and 
implementation to improve the capacity of citizens and beneficiaries to ensure that they 
are getting what they paid for from projects and contracts.  The Construction Sector 
Transparency Initiative, building on the experience and success of countries such as 
Colombia in publishing contracting details, provides a model for improving transparency 
and oversight in the sector, as well as demonstrating the key importance of government 




                                                 
41 There is an ongoing discussion around the exact nature of the disclosures related to CoST, including the 
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